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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 17-3293
_____________
LISA HATCH,
Appellant
v.
FRANKLIN COUNTY, o/a Franklin County Jail; JAMES SULLEN
_____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 1-14-cv-02318)
District Judge: Honorable Yvette Kane
______________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
November 1, 2018
______________
Before: CHAGARES, JORDAN, and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed: December 31, 2018)
______________
OPINION*
______________
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge.

*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7
does not constitute binding precedent.

Lisa Hatch appeals the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of
Appellees in her employment discrimination suit. Hatch is a former correctional officer
at the Franklin County Jail (“FCJ”) who was terminated after an inmate accused her of
inappropriate conduct. In response to her termination, Hatch filed suit against FCJ,
Franklin County, and Captain James Sullen, alleging: disability discrimination,
retaliation, and a hostile work environment under the Americans with Disability Act
(“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act
(“PHRA”), 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 951, et seq.; retaliation under the Family Medical Leave
Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq.; and gender discrimination under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., and the PHRA. For the
following reasons we will affirm.
I.
Hatch was employed by FCJ as a correctional officer from 2008 until her
termination in 2014. Hatch had a history of depression and anxiety, but she failed to
disclose it to FCJ prior to her hiring. In fact, FCJ first learned that she used medication
for her mental health issues in June 2013, when Hatch discussed her medications with
another correctional officer. Although “[t]here is an extensive factual background with
respect to Hatch’s employment history at FCJ, particularly in regard to alleged instances
of improper conduct.” (JA 8), we will only address the disciplinary incident and
investigation relied on by Appellees as the reason for Hatch’s termination.
On February 17, 2014, inmate Karl Rogers complained to FCJ nurses about
Hatch’s behavior towards him, alleging that:
2

Hatch spoke about her boyfriend and how they had not had sex
in months; describe[d] her boyfriend’s health issues; provided
[Rogers] with her Facebook information; confirmed the two had
extended conversations; describ[ed] a threesome with Officer
Caleb Barnett, who she had a crush on; that Hatch would flick
her tongue at him; carried a hand sanitizer bottle in the shape of
a pink cat which she referred to as her “pussy” and asked if he
wanted to play with it; pass[ed] gas loudly and on one occasion
then referenced anal sex with [Rogers]; told him she took
“psycho meds for her nerves”; told him she had two degrees and
was from New York; complained about her job and that she was
not chosen for the CTS [correctional treatment specialist]
position; discussed the relationship between a CTS and a
[correctional officer; and] alleged the same conduct had
occurred to former inmate Cary Thomas.
(JA 8-9; see also JA 1153–54). Rogers’s allegations led to an investigation by FCJ’s
Prison Rape Elimination Act (“PREA”) Investigation Team, which is charged with
investigating all allegations of sexual conduct involving inmates. Captain Sullen and
Deputy Warden Michelle Weller interviewed Rogers on February 18 and 19, and Rogers
reported two more instances of misconduct by Hatch. Captain Sullen immediately
prohibited Hatch from working on the medical unit, where Rogers was housed at the
time, pending the completion of the investigation. “The PREA team intended to speak
with [Hatch] on [February] 19th regarding the allegations,” but Hatch called in sick that
day. (JA 9, 1412). Hatch also did not work on February 20 or 21 because she had
previously requested those days off. (Appellee’s Br. 20).
On February 19, Sullen asked Hatch’s co-worker, Emmert Heck, to write an
incident report regarding Rogers’s allegations. Heck’s report indicated that Rogers had
previously reported Hatch’s conduct to him, particularly the sexual comments she had
made towards him. On February 24, Sullen reviewed a video of Hatch on the Medical
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Unit and her interactions with Rogers. On February 25, the PREA team interviewed
Hatch and she admitted to some of the conduct Rogers had alleged. (JA 502–504, 1156–
1163). After the interview, Sullen asked Hatch to write her own incident report
describing her interactions with Rogers. While preparing her incident report, Hatch
contacted Sullen and Warden Daniel Keen to request medical leave due to her mental
health conditions. The next day, Hatch requested and was granted FMLA leave from
FCJ’s Human Resources department. Hatch took FMLA leave from February 26 to
March 25.
While Hatch was out on FMLA leave, Sullen and Weller interviewed Officer
Barnett, who stated that Rogers “had also come to him with the allegations, as had other
[correctional officers] . . . .” (JA 10). Other than this interview, the investigation
essentially stalled during Hatch’s FMLA leave. Meanwhile, in early March, Rogers
wrote a letter to Franklin County officials and filed another grievance about Hatch.
Hatch returned from FMLA leave on March 24. The next day, she was
interviewed by Sullen, Weller, and FCJ Human Resources employee Carrie Aaron.
During the interview, Hatch admitted to more of Rogers’s allegations, namely, to doing
“things to make him laugh, like sing[ing] songs, stick[ing] out her tongue and other
things,” along with discussing her mental health problems with him. (JA 11). However,
although Hatch admitted to the behavior that formed the basis of Rogers’s allegations,
she maintained that her behavior was not inappropriate, but rather was done to “build a
rapport with inmates.” (Id.) At the conclusion of the interview, Hatch was given a
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Loudermill notice1 informing her that FCJ had just cause to discipline her based on
Rogers’s complaints.
Sullen subsequently sent a memorandum to Warden Keen outlining the findings of
the investigation into Hatch’s conduct and recommending her termination. (JA 556–559)
The memorandum explained Rogers’s allegations, the interviews conducted, and the
conduct to which Hatch had admitted; further, the memorandum stated that Sullen had
determined that Hatch’s inappropriate conduct was “unbecoming of an Officer and
detrimental to the spirt of [the FCJ].” (Id.) Lastly, the memorandum concluded by citing
numerous FCJ policies that Hatch violated, such as policies regarding appropriate
standards of conduct and behavior for FCJ employees in their interaction with inmates.2
(Id.) Consequently, Hatch was terminated on March 31, 2014. (JA 560–63).
After her termination, Hatch filed the complaint against FCJ and Captain Sullen
that forms the basis of this appeal. Hatch twice amended her complaint, and after

1

“A Loudermill notice is a formal notice provided to a public employee notifying
the employee of the employer’s intent to terminate him or her, to which the employee is
given an opportunity to respond. The process for providing an employee with such
notice was articulated by the Supreme Court in Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470
U.S. 532 (1985).” (JA 11 n.12).
2

Sullen’s memorandum declared that Hatch violated the following FCJ Standards
of Conduct, as summarized: (a) “Official Investigation” – failing to cooperate fully with
an official investigation; (b) “Personal Conduct” – failing to behave professionally; (c)
“Integrity of the Reporting System” – failing to properly submit reports; (d) “Conduct
Unbecoming” – engaging in improper behavior, unbecoming of an FCJ employee; (e)
“Untruthful Statement” – making untruthful statements pertaining to official duties; (f)
“Courtesy” – failing to maintain proper decorum and using offensive, insolent, profane,
or obscene language; and (g) “Discrimination/Harassment” – harassing an inmate. (JA
558–59).
5

extensive discovery, Appellees moved for summary judgment. The District Court
granted the motion and Hatch timely appealed.
II.
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have
appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over the
District Court’s grant of summary judgment. E.g., Heffner v. Murphy, 745 F.3d 56, 65
(3d Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). Summary judgment is proper when “there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). If the moving party shows an absence of material fact, the
non-moving party must present “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)
(quoting then-Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). The non-moving party “must present more than just
‘bare assertions, conclusory allegations, or suspicions’ to show the existence of a genuine
issue.” Podobnik v. United States Postal Serv., 409 F.3d 584, 594 (3d Cir. 2005)
(quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986)). “If the [non-moving
party’s] evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary
judgment may be granted.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249–50
(1986) (internal citations omitted).
III.
Hatch argues that the District Court erred in granting summary judgment for
Appellees on each of her claims. We address each of Hatch’s claims in turn.
A. The Disability Discrimination Claims
6

Disability discrimination claims under ADA and PHRA are analyzed pursuant to
the same legal standard—the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting test. Colwell v. Rite
Aid Corp., 602 F.3d 495, 499 n.3 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 94 F.3d
102, 105 (3d Cir. 1996)); see also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
802–03 (1973). Under this framework, a plaintiff bears the burden to prove a prima facie
discrimination case by establishing that: she has a disability, she was qualified for an
employment position with or without a reasonable accommodation, and she suffered an
adverse employment action because of her disability. Williams v. Phila. Housing Auth.
Police Dept., 380 F.3d 751, 761 (3d Cir. 2004). If a plaintiff meets that burden, the
defendant then bears the burden to produce a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for
the adverse employment action. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. If the defendant
makes such a showing, the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the
defendant’s purported reason was really pretext for discrimination. Id. at 804.
Regarding pretext, “a plaintiff . . . may defeat a motion for summary judgment by
either (i) discrediting the proffered reasons, either circumstantially or directly, or (ii)
adducing evidence, whether circumstantial or direct, that discrimination was more likely
than not a motivating or determinative cause of the adverse employment action.” Fuentes
v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764 (3d Cir. 1994). A “plaintiff must demonstrate such
weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the
employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could
rationally find them ‘unworthy of credence’ and hence infer ‘that the employer did not
act for [the asserted] non-discriminatory reasons.’” Id. at 765 (citations omitted).
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Here, Hatch asserts that she was terminated due to her mental health disability,
while FCJ contends that Hatch was terminated due to her “admitted transgression of
[FCJ] policies intimately related to the security of the institution and the safety of the
staff and inmates therein.” (JA 19). We need not reach whether Hatch has asserted a
prima facie case of discrimination because, even assuming that she has, Hatch has failed
to show that FCJ’s articulated legitimate reason for firing her was pretextual. In other
words, Hatch has failed to provide evidence that would allow a factfinder to disbelieve
FCJ’s non-discriminatory reason for firing her or to determine that discrimination was
“more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause” of her termination. Tomasso
v. Boeing Co., 445 F.3d 702, 706 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764).
In hopes of showing pretext, Hatch proffers evidence that Warden Keen and
Captain Sullen made comments about her mental health and how it affected her work.
But Hatch’s only proof of these supposed comments is her own affidavits and deposition
testimony.3 Although a plaintiff’s sworn statements by themselves may be sufficient to
create a genuine dispute of material fact, see Lupyan v. Corinthian Colls. Inc., 761 F.3d
314, 320–21 (3d Cir. 2014) (citation omitted), we do not consider Hatch’s statements in
this case to create a genuine fact issue. Considering the record of Hatch’s disciplinary
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Hatch attempts to support her claims of discriminatory comments through
circumstantial evidence in the form of signed certifications of four former correctional
officers. However, these certifications only provide generalizations regarding comments
made about Hatch and do not corroborate Hatch’s assertions about the statements made
by Keen and Sullen. (JA 564–71). Moreover, some of the former correctional officers
contradicted their certifications in their deposition testimony. (Appellees’ Supp. App.
1591–1648). Accordingly, we do not consider this evidence to corroborate Hatch’s
testimony.
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violations, and even when viewed in a light most favorable to Hatch, her own testimony
is not sufficient, standing alone, to allow a factfinder to disbelieve FCJ’s nondiscriminatory reason for firing her or to determine that discrimination was “more likely
than not a motivating or determinative cause” of her termination. Tomasso, 445 F.3d at
706.
Hatch also attempts to show pretext by offering comparator evidence of nondisabled correctional officers who behaved similarly but were not terminated. To be
proper comparators, these other employees must have been “similarly[] situated in all
respects.” In re Tribune Media Co., 902 F.3d 384, 403 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Mitchell
v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 583 (6th Cir. 1992)) (“[I]n other words, [the comparator
employees must have] ‘dealt with the same supervisor, . . . [been] subject to the same
standards, and . . . engaged in the same conduct’ during [their] altercations.” (internal
bracketing omitted)).
Hatch cites six examples where male, non-disabled officers were not terminated
for unprofessional conduct. Although all of these employees were subject to the same
standards and policies, and some of them had the same supervisor as Hatch, none of them
engaged in conduct that could be considered egregious. For instance, one officer was
suspended for sharing personal information with an inmate, and later terminated for
fraternizing with inmates. (JA 403–04, 407–08, 1427–29, 1466). Inmates accused
another officer of using racial slurs; however, this officer was never investigated for such
conduct and thus, never disciplined for it. (JA 590–91, 1436, 1478–79) The other four
officers to whom Hatch refers were all suspended for the following incidents: talking to
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an inmate about her religion and personal pictures on her phone; giving an inmate his
phone number and posting on Facebook about dating an inmate’s sister; being accused of
harassment by an officer; and using vulgar language towards an officer. (See JA 22–24,
534–51, 1429–36, 1467–78; Appellee’s Supp. App. 1536–57). Hatch has failed to
identify any comparator who engaged in behavior as ongoing, personal, and sexually
explicit as the behavior that led to her termination.
Thus, we agree with the District Court that Hatch failed to show that FCJ’s
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for her termination was pretext for discrimination.
Accordingly, we will affirm summary judgment for FCJ on Hatch’s disability
discrimination claims under the ADA and PHRA.
B. The Gender Discrimination Claims
Hatch also asserts claims of gender discrimination under Title VII and PHRA.
Gender discrimination claims are also analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas burden
shifting framework, and to establish a prima facie claim, a plaintiff must prove that: (1)
she belongs to a protected class; (2) she is qualified for her position; (3) she suffered an
adverse employment action; and (4) those outside the protected class were treated more
favorably. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. If a prima facie claim is established,
the burden shifts to the employer to show a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the
adverse employment action. Id. If the employer meets that burden, then the plaintiff
must show that the given reason was pretext for discrimination. Id. at 802–03.
Once again, Hatch cannot show that FCJ’s articulated reason for firing her was
pretext for discrimination. Hatch contends that male correctional officers were not
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terminated for engaging in the same conduct in which she engaged; she asserts the same
comparator evidence here as she did with her disability discrimination claim. Again, we
are unpersuaded by her comparator evidence and conclude that the officers whose
conduct she cites were not similarly situated to her. Her inappropriate behavior with an
inmate was much more egregious than theirs. Therefore, we hold that the District Court
properly granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees on Hatch’s gender
discrimination claim.
C. The Retaliation Claims
Hatch also asserts retaliation claims under the ADA and PHRA, arguing that her
termination was in retaliation for her requesting and taking medical leave. Hatch’s
retaliation claims are also analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas test. Williams, 380
F.3d at 759 n.3. A plaintiff must first show a prima facie case that: (1) she engaged in
protected activity, (2) she experienced an adverse employment action, and (3) there was a
causal link between her involvement in the protected activity and the adverse
employment action. Krouse v. Am. Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 500 (3d Cir. 1997)
(citations omitted). A casual connection can be proved by direct or circumstantial
evidence, Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 279–81 (3d Cir. 2000), but
courts typically “focus[] on [evidence of] two main factors[:] . . . timing and evidence of
ongoing antagonism.” Abramson v. William Paterson Coll. of N.J., 260 F.3d 265, 288
(3d Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). If a plaintiff makes a prima facie retaliation case, the
burden shifts to the defendant to show a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the
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adverse employment action; if the defendant meets that burden, the plaintiff must then
show pretext. Williams, 380 F.3d at 759, 759 n.3.
Here, Hatch asserts that she engaged in protected activity by requesting and taking
medical leave, that she was fired, and that her firing was caused by her medical leave.
She claims that the timing of her termination, days after returning from FMLA leave,
demonstrates a causal nexus between her leave and her firing. Further, she claims that
FCJ exhibited ongoing antagonism towards her. In contrast, FCJ asserts that Hatch was
terminated due to her inappropriate behavior towards inmates.
We conclude that Hatch has failed to present sufficient evidence of a causal link
between her leave and her termination. In particular, the timeline of events leading to
Hatch’s termination contradicts her claim of retaliation. Rogers complained about
Hatch’s conduct, and FCJ commenced an investigation into the matter, on February 17.
Sullen and Weller interviewed Hatch on February 25. On February 26, Hatch requested
FMLA leave from Human Resources, which was granted until March 25. When Hatch
returned from leave, FCJ officials interviewed her again and subsequently concluded the
investigation on March 31, when Hatch was fired. As the District Court aptly
summarized, “the investigation of Rogers’ accusations, which ultimately prompted
Hatch’s termination, commenced before [FCJ] became aware of Hatch’s request for
leave.” (JA 27) (emphasis added). Thus, this timeline indicates a lack of a causal link
between Hatch’s requested leave and her termination.
Hatch contends that FCJ exhibited ongoing antagonism towards her, which she
asserts shows the causal link needed to establish a retaliation claim. Hatch alleges that
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Sullen and Keen made comments about her mental health and told her she should “find a
job somewhere else.” (JA 199–20). However, as explained above, Hatch’s only
evidence of those comments is her own testimony and a few generalized statements from
former co-workers. Even if we accept Hatch’s assertions as true, this is insufficient proof
of the type of ongoing antagonism needed to establish a nexus demonstrating retaliation.
Additionally, Hatch alleges a retaliation claim under FMLA. Like a retaliation
claim under ADA, “to prevail on a retaliation claim under [] FMLA, [a] plaintiff must
prove that (1) she invoked her right to FMLA-qualifying leave, (2) she suffered an
adverse employment decision, and (3) the adverse action was causally related to her
[FMLA leave].” Lichtenstein v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., 691 F.3d 294, 301–02
(3d Cir. 2012) (citation omitted).
Hatch argues that FCJ terminated her for requesting and taking FMLA leave. She
contends that the timing of her termination, days after her return from leave, coupled with
Sullen’s comments about her mental health, prove that her leave prompted her
termination. But, as was the case with her ADA/PHRA retaliation claims, we are again
unpersuaded that Hatch’s termination was causally linked to anything other than her
inappropriate conduct with inmate Rogers. In fact, the timing of her FMLA leave
request—two days after Rogers reported her inappropriate conduct—suggests that her
request for leave was prompted by the investigation that ultimately resulted in her
termination. Thus, Hatch has not shown a nexus between her FMLA leave and her
termination.
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Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in
favor of FCJ on Hatch’s ADA/PHRA and FMLA retaliation claims.
C.
Next, we turn to Hatch’s hostile work environment claims. To establish a hostile
work environment claim under the ADA and PHRA, a plaintiff must prove that:
(1) [she] is a qualified individual with a disability under the
ADA; (2) she was subject to unwelcome harassment; (3) the
harassment was based on her disability or a request for an
accommodation; (4) the harassment was sufficiently severe or
pervasive to alter the conditions of her employment and to
create an abusive working environment; and (5) that [her
employer] knew or should have known of the harassment and
failed to take prompt effective remedial action.
Walton v. Mental Health Ass’n of Se. Pa., 168 F.3d 661, 667 (3d Cir. 1999) (citations
omitted). To be sufficiently severe or pervasive, harassment must be shown to be both
objectively and subjectively hostile or abusive. Id. (citing Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc.,
510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993)) (“[T]he environment must be objectively hostile or abusive, and
the plaintiff must have perceived it as a hostile or abusive environment.”). To determine
whether a work environment contains sufficiently severe or pervasive harassment, courts
consider the totality of the circumstances. Id. Generally, courts look to whether a
workplace was “so heavily polluted with discrimination as to destroy completely the
emotional and psychological stability of [the harassed employees] . . . .” Meritor Savs.
Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986) (citation omitted).
Here, Hatch contends that she was subject to an abusive work environment
because of “blatantly discriminatory, offensive comments by Captain Sullen, Warden
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Keen, her Lieutenant supervisors[,] and her coworkers regarding her mental health
conditions and mental health medications.” (JA 31). Hatch again supports this claim by
citing only her own affidavit and the certifications of former employees. However, even
when viewed most favorably to Hatch, this evidence does not establish a prima facie
hostile work environment claim because it does not rise to the level of severe or
pervasive for several reasons.
First, Hatch admitted to openly discussing her mental health with co-workers,
inmates, and her superior officers. Second, although the former employee certifications
do mention isolated incidents where FCJ employees generally discussed Hatch’s mental
health, they do not describe the type of harassment needed to establish a hostile work
environment. Third, the evidence suggests that, at most, FCJ officers only referenced her
mental health on a few occasions, and such sparse discussions of Hatch’s mental health
do not create a severe or pervasive hostile work environment. “[S]imple teasing, offhand
comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) [do] not amount to” an
abusive work environment. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998).
In sum, even when viewed most favorably to Hatch, the scant discussions of her
mental health do not rise to the level of severe or pervasive harassment needed to make
out a hostile work environment claim. Accordingly, we conclude that the District Court’s
grant of summary judgment in favor of the Appellees on Hatch’s hostile work
environment claims was proper.
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IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of Appellees.
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